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The Abuse of Executive Power:
Getting Beyond the Streetlight Effect 
David E. Bernstein*
For decades, scholars concerned about the abuse of presidential (and 
more generally executive-branch) authority in the domestic sphere and 
about the watering down of the separation of powers have focused on the 
scope of Chevron1 and other doctrines that demand judicial deference to the 
executive branch;2 the slow, lingering death of the non-delegation doctrine;3
and whether standing doctrine unduly inhibits litigants who wish to 
challenge government actions.4
While those are certainly important issues, they all involve doctrines 
that allow for the judiciary to determine how active it chooses to be in 
policing the executive branch. A Supreme Court concerned about executive 
abuses could narrow the scope of Chevron and other deferential doctrines, 
revive the non-delegation doctrine, loosen standing requirements, or any 
combination of the three. So while one can argue (and I would argue) that 
courts have been derelict in their duty to enforce the Constitution’s 
separation of powers, that dereliction, if it is such, has been the conscious 
decision of Supreme Court Justices. Their choice has been dictated by some 
combination of the Justices’ constitutional ideology and a pragmatic 
hesitation to tangle with a co-equal branch. If, however, the Justices ever 
thought it necessary to preserve the integrity of the American constitutional 
system, Supreme Court doctrine on the issues noted above could easily 
evolve to accommodate greater judicial supervision of the executive branch. 
 *  George Mason University Foundation Professor, George Mason University School of Law. 
This article is based in part on material published in DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015). 
1 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867, 1867 (2015) (“Everyone is sick to death of Chevron, and four gazillion other people have 
written about it, creating a huge pile of scholarship and precious little left to say.”). 
2 See, e.g., Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference after Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
813 (2015) (discussing Auer deference). 
3 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002–2003, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7
(2003); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 351 (2002); John F. 
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223 (2000); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000). 
4 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1988).??
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A more insidious long-term threat to the Constitution’s separation of 
powers is that the executive branch is increasingly undertaking significant 
but illegal, or at least extra-legal, actions which seem to leave little if any 
scope for judicial review even if the Supreme Court desired to be far more 
aggressive about policing executive action. In this Article, I discuss several 
categories of such actions, while providing examples from the Obama 
administration. Part I discusses regulations disguised as “guidance,” with 
specific reference to the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil 
Rights’ “Dear Colleague” letter regarding sexual assault on campus. Part II 
discusses measures taken during an economic emergency despite an 
absence of statutory authority for those measures, with specific reference to 
the government officials surreptitiously making day-to-day decisions for 
General Motors after the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, Part III discusses the 
refusal to implement existing law, with specific reference to the Obama 
administration’s illicit, politically motivated delays and postponements in 
enforcing various provisions of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). 
I. REGULATIONS DISGUISED AS “GUIDANCE”
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that federal 
agencies that wish to issue formal, binding regulations based on the 
agencies’ interpretation of operative statutes go through a formal notice and 
comment process.5 Once that process is complete, a regulation is published 
in the Federal Register and becomes binding, and can thereafter be 
reviewed by federal courts. The APA exempts from this process what has 
come to be known as “guidance,” but which the APA calls “interpretative 
rules [or] general statements of policy.”6
Issuance of guidance can have benign purposes: Guidance can “help to 
keep the public informed about what agency staff is thinking and they are a 
method for administrative bureau chiefs to control their subordinates’ 
behavior.”7 But guidance can also be used to in effect impose controversial 
regulations that agencies prefer not go through the ordinary rulemaking 
process. Sometimes this preference may be for reasons of convenience or 
time-sensitivity.8 Often, however, its because the agencies know that the 
rules they wish to promulgate either have a dubious, at best, legal basis, or 
because they understand that an attempt at formal rulemaking would draw 
sufficient political opposition to undermine the effort. Regardless, the 
5 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015). 
6 Id. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
7 John D. Graham & James W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of 
OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, FEDERALIST ED. 31, 38–39 
(2014).
8 Id. at 39. 
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Supreme Court has recently emphasized agency pronouncements that have 
“the force and effect of law” cannot be deemed to be “guidance.”9
The Obama administration has provided us with a perfect example of 
the use of guidance to evade and subvert the regulatory process. In April 
2011, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
sent a “Dear Colleague” letter to institutions of higher education around the 
country.10 The letter, citing as authority Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972’s ban on sex discrimination in educational institutions 
that receive federal funds, and undertaking no meaningful analysis of 
relevant judicial precedents, demanded that schools change their procedures 
for investigating sexual assault complaints to comply with detailed and 
specific OCR dictates.11
Despite consistent prescriptive language the Dear Colleague letter 
describing what schools “should” and “must” do, the OCR disclaimed the 
notion that it was issuing binding regulations. Rather, footnote 1 of the Dear 
Colleague letter states, that “this Dear Colleague Letter is a ‘significant 
guidance document’ under the Office of Management and Budget’s Final 
Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices.”12 OCR, the footnote 
continues,
issues this and other policy guidance to provide recipients with 
information to assist them in meeting their obligations, and to provide 
members of the public with information about their rights, under the 
civil rights laws and implementing regulations that we enforce. OCR’s 
legal authority is based on those laws and regulations. This letter does 
not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and 
examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether 
covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.13
Despite this disclaimer, the letter in fact invented new legal 
requirements for sexual assault investigations, without going through the 
notice and comment process, and without citing any existing legal authority 
justifying the imposition of such requirements. 
In the letter and in a follow-up 2014 “Questions and Answers” 
document,14 OCR required colleges to lower the level of proof needed to 
9   Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199. 1204 (2015). 
10 Office for Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 4, 2011), www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]. 
11 Id.
12 Id. at n.1. 
13 Id.
14 Office for Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual 
Violence (Apr. 2014), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [hereinafter 
Questions and Answers]. 
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find students accused of sexual misconduct guilty. Most universities had 
long used a “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard for student 
disciplinary hearings.15 OCR announced that universities would be liable 
for violating Title IX unless they shifted to a more liberal “preponderance” 
of evidence standard.16
OCR also in effect barred schools from providing accused students 
with a fair disciplinary process.17 Though cross-examination is among the 
core tools by which litigants reveal the truth, and no complainant or 
plaintiff in a civil or criminal court case could exempt himself from being 
called as a witness, OCR “strongly discourages” schools from allowing the 
accused student to cross-examine his accuser, lest it traumatize the 
accuser.18 Nor, apparently, does OCR guidance permit an accused student’s 
representative to cross-examine the accuser. Rather, a school “may choose, 
instead, to allow the parties to submit questions to a trained third party (e.g., 
the hearing panel) to ask the questions on their behalf.”19 Even then, “OCR 
recommends that the third party screen the questions submitted by the 
parties and only ask those it deems appropriate and relevant to the case.”20
OCR also forbade university disciplinary panels from considering an 
accusing student’s sexual history with anyone other than the accused.21
Over the last few decades, almost all American courts have limited the 
extent to which accused rapists can bring in the sexual past of an alleged 
victim.22 This ensures that rape trials are not in effect also putting the victim 
on trial. But no jurisdiction has adopted a blanket rule excluding all sexual
history evidence not involving the accused, in part because of concerns that 
such a rule would violate the due process rights of defendants.23 Such 
evidence is occasionally highly relevant to a case, and a blanket rule would 
deprive the defendant in such cases of a valid defense.24
15 James M. Picozzi, Note, University Disciplinary Process: What’s Fair, What’s Due, and What 
You Don’t Get, 96 YALE L.J. 2132, 2159 n.117 (1987) (citing Nicholas Long, The Standard of Proof in 
Student Disciplinary Cases, 12 J.C. & U.L. 71 (1985)) (“Courts, universities, and student defendants all 
seem to agree that the appropriate standard of proof in student disciplinary cases is one of ‘clear and 
convincing’ evidence.”). 
16 Questions and Answers, supra note 14, at 13. 
17 Office for Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence: 
Background, Summary, and Fast Facts (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
dcl-factsheet-201104.pdf; see also Questions and Answers, supra note 14. 
18 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 10, at 12. 
19 Questions and Answers, supra note 14, at 31. 
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 858–59 (2013). 
23 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) (requiring admission of evidence whose exclusion would 
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights). 
24 Imagine, for example, that a video circulates around a college campus showing a male and a 
female student engaging in what most people would consider a degrading sex act for the woman. The 
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OCR also states that a “school should also ensure that hearings are 
conducted in a manner that does not inflict additional trauma on the 
complainant,” which implies that the school should not start the 
proceedings with a presumption of innocence, or even a stance of 
neutrality.25 Rather, the reference to “additional trauma” suggests that 
university officials should assume that any complaint is valid and the 
accused is guilty as charged. 
The result of all this has been what one attorney calls “a shocking lack 
of ‘process,’ to say nothing of due process, in the way some universities are 
handling sexual assault complaints.”26 So where did OCR get the authority 
to impose its guidelines? Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is 
famous for forcing universities to upgrade their women’s sports programs 
to prevent sex discrimination in collegiate athletics, but it goes well beyond 
that. Courts have held that sexual harassment is a form of sex 
discrimination, including when one student harasses another. Schools 
subject to Title IX are responsible for monitoring and preventing 
harassment. OCR concluded that if Title IX requires universities to combat 
sexual harassment because it interferes with women’s educational 
opportunities, universities must also punish sexual assault for the same 
reason.27
That’s fine as far as it goes—though it raises the issue of whether the 
reasoning applies to same-sex assault, or assaults by women on men)—but 
it fails to explain why Title IX requires the specific impositions of the OCR 
letter. In fact, Title IX likely does not give OCR the authority to dictate the 
nature of university disciplinary proceedings. No cases suggest that an 
investigation of an allegation of sexual assault on campus must adhere to 
anything like the guidelines OCR is imposing on colleges.28 The Supreme 
Court has stated in the context of Title IX that at least when public school 
officials are sued for allegedly not properly intervening in student-on-
woman then files a complaint with the university, claiming she was sexually assaulted. During the 
investigation, the complainant claims she would never voluntarily consent to such a degrading act. The 
accused, however, locates four men willing to testify that they engaged in the exact same act with the 
accuser, and it was fully consensual. One of them even has his own video of the interaction. Under the 
OCR guidelines, the student accused of sexual assault would not be allowed to present that evidence. 
25 Questions and Answers, supra note 14, at 31. 
26 Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault Allegations, Adjudications, and Title IX, THE
CHAMPION, Nov. 2015, at 16; see also Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment 
Policy, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-
sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html; Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, 
N.Y.TIMES (Nov.15,2014),www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape.html?_r=0.
27 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 10. 
28 See Hans Bader, Education Department Illegally Ordered Colleges to Reduce Due-Process 
Safeguards, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 21, 2012), www.examiner.com/article/education-department-
illegally-ordered-colleges-to-reduce-due-process-safeguards.
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student harassment “courts should refrain from second guessing the 
disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.”29 School officials 
“must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not 
clearly unreasonable.”30 One would presume that the same rationale would 
apply to claims of sexual assault by a peer at an institution of higher 
learning.
Even if Title IX does give OCR the power to dictate campus 
disciplinary rules, OCR needed to go through the normal notice and 
comment regulatory process before making new regulations, rather than just 
announcing them through a “Dear Colleague” letter that is subject to neither 
normal administrative safeguards nor to judicial review.31 Of course, OCR 
would argue that the Dear Colleague letter was mere “guidance” without 
the force of law, but that is an evasion. In addition to the prescriptive 
language in the letter noted previously, which suggests that OCR was 
treating the guidance as having the force of law, we can judge the practical 
effects of what OCR accomplished by how universities reacted, rather than 
by whether OCR was officially making new law or not. 
Universities around the country scrambled to change their procedures 
to comport with the guidance set forth in the letter.32 Some, feeling pressure 
from OCR, reopened past investigations that had exonerated the accused.33
And what choice did the universities really have? Because OCR did not 
purport to make a formal, legally binding regulation, there was no way to 
challenge its guidance in court, and OCR itself, despite the disclaimer in the 
Dear Colleague letter, was treating the guidance as binding, as it opened 
multiple investigations of universities for allegedly violating Title IX when 
dealing with sexual assault claims. Moreover, experience suggested that 
anything but full and immediate obedience to OCR’s agenda in this area 
would lead to lengthy, costly investigation of university’s policy, with the 
potential penalty of a loss of crucial federal funding, including student 
29 Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). 
30 Id. at 649 (emphasis added). 
31 Hans Bader, No, OCR’s April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter Is Not Entitled to Deference,
WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 17, 2013), www.examiner.com/article/no-ocr-s-april-4-2011-dear-colleague-
letter-is-not-entitled-to-deference.
32 Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. 590, 595 
(2016) (noting that the Dear Colleague Letter “has transformed how higher educational institutions 
address allegations of sexual assault”). As Novkov explains (without discussing the problematic nature 
of the explanation), the Dear Colleague letter came in response to concerns from anti-sexual assault 
activists that Title IX was insufficient to combat sexual violence on campus. In other words, Novkov 
describes the letter not as an interpretation of Title IX, but as a response to the perceived inadequacies of 
Title IX. Id.; see also id. at 607–08 (“These changes acknowledge that Title IX does not really address 
sexual assault and seek to reconfigure it so that it can do so.”). Of course, federal agencies do not have 
the power to make what they see as good policy without having a legal basis for doing so. 
33 See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED
ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW, ch. 8 (2015). 
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loans.34
Indeed, when someone in Congress—Senator Lamar Alexander—
finally got around in 2014 to asking Catherine Lhamon, the Department of 
Education’s Assistant Secretary for the Office for Civil Rights about the 
letter, she testified that “she expected institutions of higher education to 
fully comply with OCR’s guidance.”35 Needless to say, if the government 
expects “compliance,” it is in effect regulating the affected parties, even if it 
purports to only be issuing “guidance.” 
Over a year later, Senator Alexander revisited the issue with 
Department of Education Deputy Assistant Secretary Amy McIntosh: 
Senator Alexander: Now Ms. McIntosh, do you believe that we gave 
Ms. Lhamon the authority to make Title IX guidance binding on 6,000 
higher education institutions?
. . .
Ms. McIntosh: Let me assure you, I tried to be very clear in my 
opening statement that guidance that the Department issues does not 
have the force of law. 
Senator Alexander: But this is the assistant secretary of the 
department, with Title IX, which affects 6,000 institutions, 100,000 
public schools. And she apparently hadn’t gotten the word. Who’s 
going to tell her? 
Ms. McIntosh: So . . . 
Senator Alexander: Are you? 
Ms. McIntosh: As she knows and as I know, Title IX is the binding 
law that applies in the cases that you are describing . . .  
Senator Alexander: So guidance under Title IX is not binding—is that 
correct?
Ms. McIntosh: Guidance under Title IX is not binding. Guidance helps 
the many people who are subject to Title IX understand what they 
need to do to comply with the law. 
Senator Alexander: Right. But who is going to tell Ms. Lhamon this?36
34 See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual 
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49 (2013) (reviewing past OCR investigations of 
universities).
35 Joseph Cohn, Department of Education’s Overreach Questioned by Senator Lamar 
Alexander, FIRE (Sept. 30, 2015), www.thefire.org/department-of-educations-overreach-questioned-by-
senator-lamar-alexander.
36 Alexander Questions Dept. of Ed. Witness at HSGAC Hearing on Regulatory Guidance,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2015), www.youtube.com/watch?v=dIiXuv-Oirw. 
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Eight days later, Senator James Lankford followed up with questions to 
Undersecretary of Education Ted Mitchell: 
Senator Lankford: Let me move on to another process-type question, 
and that is guidance. What is your process on making a decision when 
you are discussing whether you are going to do a guidance document 
or regulation? Is there a written out process that you have in place to 
say if all of these things—or even if one of these things—is true then 
there needs to be a regulation? 
Mr. Mitchell: So we’re guided by the OMB bulletins and by our own 
office of general counsel and the bright line as I believe my colleague 
Amy McIntosh told you last week is that for us, if there is a—if there 
is a statement that we want to make, or a statement or an area we 
believe needs to be investigated and where we need consultation with 
the field that will result in having the force of law, we believe that at 
that point we are bound to enter into rulemaking. 
Senator Lankford: Clearly the bright line is, if it is binding, then that is 
a regulation. 
Mr. Mitchell: That’s right. 
Senator Lankford: The challenge that I hear over and over again from 
institutions of higher education is, they have a tremendous number of 
guidance documents that are coming to them, and they do not feel the 
freedom to be able to come back to Education, the Department of Ed, 
and say this smells a lot like a regulation to me because this is also 
where a stream of funding comes from. And so, they feel like they 
have to take it. Where other entities, obviously private businesses, they 
get a guidance document come down, they file lawsuits, and they 
challenge, and they push back on it. Institutions of higher education 
are actually leaning back and saying, I don’t feel the freedom to be 
able to challenge this for fear that we’ll also have other things. Now, 
I’m sure your answer is, they shouldn’t be afraid of us; we’re their 
friends. But I would tell you, they are very concerned that they’re—not 
only the way the regulations are coming out, but the frequency of those 
regulations and the pure cumulative result of that is they’re drowning 
in guidance documents and “Dear Colleague” letters, is actually how 
they are coming from you, and this sheer number of “Dear Colleague” 
letters they feel like they can’t challenge. 
Mr. Mitchell: So let me say that I’m hearing—I hear the same things 
when I talk to my colleagues in higher education. And in each of those 
conversations I do try to reiterate what Amy said last week and I will 
say again. Our guidance does not hold the force of law and our 
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recommendations and illustrations of the ways in which we are 
interpreting the statute and the regulations. So we are happy, in fact, to 
continue in conversations with institutions of higher education.37
So for four years OCR, acting without any plausible claim to be 
relying on established legal authority, treated its guidance as binding rules 
that applied to almost every institution of higher learning in the United 
States and treated those rules as binding. Only after two U.S. senators 
challenged Department of Education officials did anyone acknowledge 
publicly that the guidance could legally be deemed only 
“recommendations” and “illustrations.”38 Nevertheless, OCR has not sent 
any follow-up correspondence to universities explaining that its guidance is 
not binding. 
Had OCR instead offered formal regulations through the procedures 
dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act, universities and others could 
have (1) challenged the factual underpinning of the new rules for sexual 
assault cases (the dubious notion that there is a rising epidemic of sexual 
assault on campuses nationwide);39 (2) argued, probably correctly, that 
OCR’s guidelines are inconsistent with relevant Supreme Court precedent 
on university obligations regarding peer-on-peer harassment;40 and (3) 
argued that regardless of (1) and (2), OCR was unconstitutionally forcing 
universities to violate accused students’ due process rights.41 If OCR had 
chosen to ignore or reject these arguments, the regulations could then have 
been challenged in federal court. 
37 Quoted in Second Department of Education Official in Eight Days Tells Congress Guidance Is 
Not Binding, FIRE (Oct. 2, 2015), www.thefire.org/second-department-of-education-official-in-eight-
days-tells-congress-guidance-is-not-binding.
38 See Jake New, Guidance or Rule Making?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 7, 2016), 
www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/01/07/senators-challenge-legality-us-guidance-campus-sexual-assault.
39 Sexual assault on campus, as elsewhere in society, is a serious problem, but sex crimes at 
universities, as elsewhere in society, have declined dramatically over the last twenty years. Figures 
bandied about by the Obama administration and others to the effect that one in five college women will 
be sexually assaulted, massively exaggerate the problem’s scope. See Rape and Sexual Assault: A 
Renewed Call to Action, White House Council on Women and Girls (Jan. 2014), www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/sexual_assault_report_1-21-14.pdf; see also Lynn Langton, Rape And Sexual 
Assault Among College-Age Females, 1995-2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS (Dec. 11, 2014), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf; Mark 
Perry, Before Declaring That There’s a “Rape Epidemic” in the U.S., Has Anybody Bothered to Check 
the Actual Data? Apparently Not, AEI IDEAS (May 17, 2014), www.aei-ideas.org/2014/05/before-
declaring-that-theres-a-rape-epidemic-in-the-us-has-anybody-bothered-to-check-the-actual-data-apparen
tly-not/#mbl; Cathy Young, The White House Overreaches on Campus Rape, MINDING THE CAMPUS
(Jan. 23, 2014), www.mindingthecampus.com/2014/01/the_white_house_overreaches_on. 
40 See discussion supra notes 28–30. 
41 Courts have consistently held that the government acts illegally when it forces a private 
institution to treat an individual in a way that would be illegal if the government did it directly. E.g.,
Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991); Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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Instead, we are left with a situation in which the federal government 
made up rules that apply to almost every college and university in the 
country, creating a witch-hunt-like atmosphere on many campuses,42 with 
only the barest thread of legal authority to back it up. 
II. EMERGENCY ECONOMIC MEASURES WITH NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The Supreme Court established in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer43 (the Steel Seizure Case) that economic emergency, even in a 
wartime context, does not give the President authority to go act beyond 
statutory limits. Presidential power is especially constrained when Congress 
has explicitly declined to give the President the authority he seeks to 
exercise.44 Nevertheless, when economic emergency struck in fall 2008, the 
George W. Bush administration ignored statutory limits and the expressed 
will of Congress and chose to exercise authority that Congress had 
explicitly denied it. The Obama administration, rather than rolling back this 
improper exercise of executive power, instead expanded it. The end result 
was that the federal government ran the day-to-day activities of a major 
U.S. corporation, General Motors (GM), without any legal authority for 
doing so. 
The Bush administration, with the acquiescence of Congress, 
established the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, at the height of 
the 2008 financial crisis.45 TARP authorized the Secretary of the U.S. 
Treasury “to purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial institution, on 
such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary.”46 In 
December 2008, the Bush administration asked Congress for money to bail 
out Chrysler and GM. The House went along,47 but the Senate refused.48
In a foreshadowing of Obama administration rhetoric, the Bush 
administration argued that Congress’s refusal to rubber-stamp the 
President’s proposal justified what amounted to unilateral, illegal action by 
the President. Bush took $17 billion out of the $700 billion TARP fund to 
lend to the car companies, even though the fund was only supposed to be 
42 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at ch. 8. 
43 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
44 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). Though not the opinion for the Court’s majority, Justice 
Jackson’s opinion in the long-run has had the most influence. 
45 Troubled Asset Relief Program, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–41, 5251–53, 5261 (2015). 
46 Id. § 5211(a)(1); see also Todd Zywicki, The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law, 7 NAT’L
AFFAIRS 66 (Spring 2011), www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20110317_Zywicki.pdf. 
47 See Brent J. Horton, The TARP Bailout of GM: A Legal Historical and Literary Critique, 14 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 216 (2010). 
48 David M. Herszenhorn, Bill Vlasic & Carl Hulse, Senate Abandons Auto Bailout Bid After 
G.O.P Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1. 
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used for “financial institutions.”49 A White House spokesman justified this 
presidential power-grab by explaining, “Congress lost its opportunity to be 
a partner because they couldn’t get their job done.”50
The government then gave GM and Chrysler ninety days to come up 
with viable turnaround plans.51 By the time the deadline arrived, the Obama 
administration was in office and neither company had made significant 
progress.52 Obama’s underlings ordered Chrysler to merge with Italian 
automaker Fiat.53 Steven Rattner, Obama’s “car czar,” meanwhile ordered 
GM CEO Rick Wagoner to resign. Given GM’s dependence on TARP 
money, Wagoner had no choice. So an unelected government bureaucrat—
one not even confirmed by the Senate, even though he pretty clearly 
qualified as a “principal officer” for constitutional purposes—fired the CEO 
of a major American company.54 The Obama administration meanwhile 
more than tripled the amount of TARP funds available to GM, without 
Congressional approval.55
Rattner also forced out GM’s acting chairman and personally recruited 
its new chairman.56 Rattner and his automobile industry task force made all 
major business decisions for GM, including which brands to keep and 
which dealerships it should shed and how quickly it should shed them.57 For 
public consumption, the task force pretended that GM was acting 
autonomously. Rattner later complained that “as we drafted press 
statements and fact sheets, I would constantly force myself to write that 
‘GM has done such and such.’ Just once I would have liked to write ‘we’ 
instead.”58
Needless to say, a law that provided for the bailout of “financial 
institutions,” however broadly construed, did not give the government the 
power to make day-to-day business decisions for GM. Rattner not only did 
not care, he reveled in the lawlessness. The auto industry rescue, he wrote, 
“succeeded in no small part because we did not have to deal with 
Congress.”59 If he had not been able to act unilaterally, he added, “we 
49 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1). 
50 GENE HEALY, THE CULT OF THE PRESIDENCY 304 (2009). 








58 STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S
EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 210 (2011). 
59 Id. at 187. 
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would have been subject to endless congressional posturing, deliberating, 
bickering, and micromanagement, in the midst of which one or more of the 
troubled companies under our care would have gone bankrupt.”60 Either 
that, or the Obama administration could have followed the law and 
cooperated and compromised with Congress. Given that Congress had a 
huge Democratic majority inclined to go along with the administration’s 
initiatives, the Obama administration could hardly blame potential partisan 
obstructionism for its failure to respect the separation of powers. 
III. REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW
The Obama administration has faced persistent criticism for allegedly 
picking and choosing which laws it chooses to enforce. Critics have 
claimed that President Obama has been derelict in his duty to enforce the 
work requirements of the 1996 welfare reform law,61 has illegitimately 
ordered U.S. attorneys to not enforce the federal ban on marijuana in states 
where it is legal, and, most famously, has illicitly ordered federal officials 
not to enforce immigration law.62 The legality of President Obama’s 
executive order granting de facto (albeit temporary) legal status to millions 
of undocumented residents of the United States is currently pending before 
the Supreme Court.63 In a sign that some Justices are concerned that the 
President has been derelict in his duty to enforce the law, the Court sua 
sponte added to its cert grant the issue of whether the President’s order 
violates the “Take Care Clause” of the Constitution, a clause that until now 
the Court has not deemed justiciable as a limit on executive discretion.64
With regard to immigration law, the Obama administration has at least 
a plausible argument that given limited enforcement resources, the 
President is acting within his discretion by exempting certain classes of 
undocumented residents from deportation, and that such exemption entitles 
the adult immigrants in question to receive work permits.65 Much more 
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Robert Rector, How Obama Has Gutted Welfare Reform, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 
2012), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-obama-has-gutted-welfore-reform/2012/09/06/885b009
2-f835-11e1-8b93-c4f4ab1c8d13_story.html.
62 See Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to 
Deferred Action, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 96 (2015), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/
03/Blackman-Supplemental-4.pdf; Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully 
Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 219 (2015). 
63 United States v. Texas, no. 15-674 (pending). 
64 See David Bernstein, Supreme Court Bombshell: Does Obama’s Immigration Guidance 
Violate the Take Care Clause?, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/01/19/supreme-court-bombshell-does-obamas-immigration-guidance-violate-the-ta
ke-care-clause.
65 See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. and the 
Counsel to the President 10 (Nov. 19, 2014), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/
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troubling is the administration’s refusal to enforce statutory compliance 
deadlines mandated by the Affordable Care Act, supposedly President 
Obama’s own signature legislative accomplishment. Not only does the 
administration not have a plausible legal argument for its (in)actions, it has 
not even attempted to provide any.66
Many of these (in)actions were undertaken for transparently political 
reasons.67 For example, Obamacare requires most employers with more 
than fifty employees to provide an approved insurance plan to their workers 
by January 1, 2014, or pay a fine per uninsured employee. By 2013, it 
became apparent that many smaller companies were planning to abandon 
whatever insurance coverage they had previously provided employees, pay 
the relatively small fine, and dump their employees onto the Obamacare 
exchanges, where many of them would qualify for federal subsidies. 
To avoid this pending political disaster, on July 2, 2013, the Obama 
administration announced in a Treasury Department blog post,68 that for 
employers with between fifty and ninety-nine employees the insurance 
mandate would be postponed until 2015—not coincidentally, after the 2014 
midterm elections. Meanwhile, the administration issued rules with 
absolutely no legal authority to do so requiring any employer who took 
advantage of the delay to not subsequently reduce or eliminate health 
insurance and throw its employees on to the exchanges. In March 2014, the 
administration delayed full implementation of the employer mandate until 
2016.69
Similarly, the President’s “if you like your plan, you can keep it” lie70
became a massive political headache for the Democrats in the fall of 2013. 
Many individuals and businesses who had insured themselves outside of 
attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf.
66 Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2721391; see also
Jonathan H. Adler, The Ad Hoc Implementation and Enforcement of Health Care Reform, in LIBERTY’S
NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF THE STATE 13 (Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016). 
67 This has been an Obama administration modus operandi in a variety of contexts. See Josh 
Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 213 (2015); Juliet Eilperin, White House Delayed Enacting Rules Ahead of 2012 Election to Avoid 
Controversy, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-delayed-
enacting-rules-ahead-of-2012-election-to-avoid-controversy/2013/12/14/7885a494-561a-11e3-ba82-16e
d03681809_story.html.
68 Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, TREAS.
BLOG (July 2, 2013), www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Continuing-to-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-
Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx.
69 Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8574 
(2014).
70 Angie Drobnic Holan, Lie of the Year: “If You Like Your Health Care Plan, You Can Keep 
It”, POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2013), www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2013/dec/12/lie-year-if-you-
like-your-health-care-plan-keep-it.
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group plans received cancellation notices from their insurance company 
because their plans did not meet “minimum essential coverage” 
requirements under Obamacare. On November 14, 2013, the Obama 
administration issued guidance encouraging state insurance commissioners 
to allow existing non-Obamacare compliant plans that were in effect on 
October 1, 2013, to continue through October 1, 2014.71 Remarkably, the 
Obama administration was asking insurance commissioners to disobey 
federal law. In December, President Obama announced that the federal 
government would not enforce the individual mandate in 2014 against 
people whose insurance policies were canceled due to Obamacare.72 On 
March 5, 2014, the administration asked state insurance commissioners not 
to enforce Obamacare rules that would require existing plans to fold until 
October 1, 201673––again not surprisingly, well after the 2014 midterm 
elections. Nothing in the statute gave the President the authority to waive 
the relevant mandatory deadlines. 
South Texas College of Law professor Josh Blackman aptly calls the 
administration’s unilateral announcements of changes to Obamacare 
“government by blog post,” a completely unconstitutional way of 
governing.74 Obama preferred governing this way even when Republicans 
offered to work with him. Before Obama announced that he would ignore 
the law and allow the grandfathering of otherwise unlawful health care 
plans, Republicans proposed a bill that would have grandfathered existing 
plans. The President announced he would veto any such bill.75
Professor Nicholas Bagley, a supporter of Obamacare, acknowledges 
not just that the Obama administration has been unlawful, but that the 
administration has not even tried to publicly defend its lawfulness: 
The Obama administration appears to justify the delays as routine 
exercises of the executive branch’s traditional authority to choose 
when, where, and under what circumstances to enforce statutes. (I say 
“appears” since the administration has not, with one exception 
discussed below, offered a thorough-going public defense of the 
71 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., to State Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 14, 2013), www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/letters/
downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf.
72 Ezra Klein, The Individual Mandate No Longer Applies to People Whose Plans Were 
Canceled, WASH. POST (Dec. 19 2013),  www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/19/the-
obama-administration-just-delayed-the-individual-mandate-for-people-whose-plans-have-been-canceled.
73 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (HHS), HHS 2015 Health Policy Standards Fact 
Sheet (Mar. 5, 2014), www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-
items/2014-03-05-2.html.
74 Josh Blackman, Obamacare and Government by Blog Post, LIBERTYLAW (Mar. 24, 2014), 
www.libertylawsite.org/2014/03/10/obamacare-and-government-by-blog-post.
75 Justin Sink, White House Threatens Veto of Upton Bill, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2013), http://
thehill.com/homenews/administration/190365-white-house-threatens-veto-of-upton-bill.
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delays.) . . .
This defense, however, runs counter to legal conventions governing 
the president’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.” Most notably, the administrative delays are not the sorts of 
“discretionary judgment[s] concerning the allocation of enforcement 
resources” that, according to Heckler, lie at the heart of the 
nonenforcement power. The delays are instead bald efforts to avoid 
unwanted consequences associated with full implementation of the 
ACA.76
Bagley argues that one should not consider the Obama administration 
to more generally be lawless in its implementation of Obamacare, because 
the administration has enforced many other provisions that it would have 
preferred to ignore.77 I am inclined, however, to agree with Professor 
Jonathan Adler, who rejoins, “where Bagley finds admirable restraint, I 
suspect calculation. It seems to me the administration has strayed from the 
ACA’s text law when and where it thinks it’s difficult for critics to obtain 
judicial review.”78
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed three types of executive branch misbehavior 
that is difficult or impossible to constrain via judicial review: informally 
regulating through “guidance” rather than promulgating formal regulations 
through the notice-and-comment process; ignoring statutory limits and 
congressional objections in exercising spending and regulatory authority in 
an economic emergency; and delaying the implementation of duly-enacted 
legislation for political reasons. This article provided one prominent Obama 
administration example for each of these. 
The article could also have discussed abuses attendant to “sue and 
settle,” which occurs when an agency, frustrated that Congress or the courts 
are blocking its preferred policies, implicitly colludes with outside groups 
to settle litigation against the agency on terms that require the agency to do 
what Congress or the courts previously prohibited. The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce estimates that from 2009 to 2012, seventy lawsuits were settled 
under circumstances such that they can be categorized as sue and settle 
cases.79 While in theory judges could refuse to rubber-stamp these 
76 Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2721391.
77 Id.
78 Jonathan H. Adler, The Illegal Implementation of Obamacare, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2016),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/27/the-illegal-implementation-of-obam
acare.
79 William L. Kovacs, Keith W. Holman & Jonathan A. Jackson, A Report on Sue and Settle: 
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settlements, in practice, Article III judges have no coherent mechanism of 
distinguishing between “sue and settle” settlements and legitimate 
settlements of adversarial litigation. 
The Obama administration also abused executive power in a manner 
not conducive to judicial oversight when the President undermined an 
ongoing Justice Department investigation of illegal political discrimination 
by the IRS by announcing publicly in the middle of the investigation that no 
intentional wrongdoing occurred.80 In another troubling instance, the Justice 
Department, breaking a longstanding norm that it will defend in court any 
duly enacted federal law that has a plausible legal defense, refused to 
defend the Defense of Marriage Act for transparently political reasons.81
None of these abuses of executive authority and discretion are easily 
subject to meaningful judicial oversight. Administrative law professors will 
undoubtedly keep churning out articles on Chevron and other doctrinal 
standbys because of the Streetlight Effect.82 But to the extent academics are 
Regulating Behind Closed Doors, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 2013), www.uschamber.com/
sites/default/files/documents/files/SUEANDSETTLEREPORT-Final.pdf.
80 While a criminal investigation was still ongoing, President Obama falsely declared that the 
scandal was the result of “bone-headed decisions” out of a local office and that there is “not even a 
smidgen [of evidence] of corruption” in the scandal. “Not Even a Smidgen of Corruption”: Obama 
Downplays IRS, Other Scandals, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 3, 2014), www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/
03/not-even-smidgen-corruption-obama-downplays-irs-other-scandals.
81 For decades, attorneys general of the United States have taken the position that regardless of 
their administration’s own view of a law, “they will not call into question the constitutionality of any 
federal statute unless the law is so patently unconstitutional that no defense of it could mounted in good 
conscience.” PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 127 (2009). Yet with a tight 2012 reelection battle pending, and gay rights 
groups clamoring for the administration, which had still not announced its support for same-sex 
marriage, to show some good will, the administration refused to defend the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) before the Supreme Court. Attorney General Holder argued that the Justice Department in 
good conscience could not defend DOMA because there were no legitimate arguments to be made for its 
constitutionality. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the 
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-litigation-
involving-defense-marriage-act. That was a rather implausible claim, given that the Department of 
Justice had defended DOMA in court just a year earlier. When the case reached the Supreme Court, with 
DOMA defended by counsel for the House of Representatives, Justice Kennedy, for the majority, noted 
that Holder’s “failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional 
theory not yet established in judicial decisions has created a procedural dilemma” and warned that such 
behavior “poses grave challenges to the separation of powers.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2688 (2013). See also Ed Whelan, DOMA Ruling Did Not “Vindicate” Eric Holder, BENCH
MEMOS, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 29, 2014), www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/389061/doma-ruling-
did-not-vindicate-eric-holder-ed-whelan.
82 As described by Wikipedia, the “streetlight effect is a type of observational bias where people 
only look for whatever they are searching by looking where it is easiest.” Streetlight Effect, WIKIPEDIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streetlight_effect (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). It comes from the following 
old joke:
A policeman sees a drunken man searching for something under a streetlight and asks what the 
drunk has lost. He says he lost his keys and they both look under the streetlight together. After a 
few minutes, the policeman asks if he is sure he lost them here, and the drunk replies, no, and that 
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concerned with abuses of executive authority, we need to look beyond the 
familiar and obvious and to the novel mechanisms by which President 
Obama, and undoubtedly future Presidents, seek to undermine Congress 
and to arrogate power to themselves. 
he lost them in the park. The policeman asks why he is searching here, and the drunk replies, “this 
is where the light is.” 
